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Abstract
This paper addresses one of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient
and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing market design. We formulate it as
a fair cost allocation problem through the lens of the cooperative game theory. A
special property of the cooperative ridesharing game is that its characteristic func-
tion values are calculated by solving an optimization problem. Several concepts of
fairness are investigated and special attention is paid to a solution concept named
nucleolus, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction in the system. Due
to its computational intractability, we break the problem into a master-subproblem
structure and two subproblems are developed to generate constraints for the master
problem. We propose a coalition generation procedure to find the nucleolus and
approximate nucleolus of the game. Experimental results showed that when the
game has a non-empty core, in the approximate nucleolus scheme the coalitions are
computed only when it is necessary and the approximate procedure produces the
actual nucleolus. And when the game has an empty core, the approximate nucleolus
is close to the actual one. Regardless of the emptiness of the game, our algorithm
needs to generate only a small fraction (1.6%) of the total coalition constraints to
compute the approximate nucleolus. The proposed model and results nicely fit sys-
tems operated by autonomous vehicles.
∗Amazon.com, Inc., theweilu@amazon.com. This work was done prior to the author joining Amazon.
†Zachry Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, lquadrifoglio@civil.tamu.edu,
the corresponding author.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
07
26
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
9 F
eb
 20
19
21 Introduction
Ridesharing services, whose aim is to gather travelers with similar itineraries and compat-
ible schedules, are able to provide substantial environmental and social benefits through
reducing the use of private vehicles. When the operations of a ridesharing system are
optimized, it can also save travelers a significant amount of transportation cost. The eco-
nomic benefits associated with ridesharing in turn attract more travelers to participate in
ridesharing services and thereby improve the utilization of transportation infrastructure
capacity.
An optimized ridesharing service is usually designed to minimize the system-wide travel
cost. This is beneficial in the society’s point of view, assuming each agent accepts the
system’s assignment. This is, however, a strong assumption considering agents might
form their own ridesharing groups if they find doing so is more of their own interest.
Recall that the agents of ridesharing system participate in this system in the hope of
saving travel cost. So it is up to the ridesharing service provider to decide how the travel
cost would be shared among customers after a ridesharing plan is proposed and accepted
by the customers. This is a non-trivial task because if the agents find the cost allocation
scheme unfair, they may leave the system and form their own ridesharing group in the
long run. This fair cost-allocation situation is critical to the sustainability of a ridesharing
system and thus is the motivation of the study in this paper.
The ridesharing cost allocation problem is modeled as a cooperative game. Cooperative
game theory, due to its close relation to combinatorial optimization, has drawn significant
attention of the operations research community. Since its introduction by (von Neumannn
and Morgenstern, 1944), cooperative game theory has developed several solution concepts
that aim to resolve the benefits (cost) allocation issues among cooperative players. In this
paper, we are primarily concerned with a particular cost allocation solution concept - the
nucleolus. The nucleolus of a cooperative game has several nice properties. Intuitively,
it is a solution to the cost allocation problem that minimizes the maximal dissatisfaction
among the customers.
The concept of nucleolus was first suggested by (Schmeidler, 1969) and since then was
developed by (Shapley, 1967) and (Maschler et al., 1979). Although the nucleolus has
several game theoretic virtues, the computation of nucleolus is very difficult. In fact, for
a n-player game, as the size of the characteristic function grows exponentially with the
number of players, any enumeration algorithm that computes the nucleolus that requires
the entire information of the characteristic function takes O(2n) time, assuming the char-
acteristic function is readily available. Moreover, as will be shown in later section, finding
3the characteristic function value of ridesharing game involves solving an optimization
problem related to the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), which is NP-hard itself. This
means the computation of the nucleolus of ridesharing game can easily become intractable
and more efficient algorithm needs to be developed.
In this paper, we propose a nucleolus-finding algorithm for the ridesharing game by suc-
cessively solving a number of linear and integer programs. The linear programming (LP)
problem for nucleolus calculation was first studied by Kopelowitz (1967) and stimulated
several LP-based algorithms for nucleolus computation. Dragan (1981) suggested an algo-
rithm for computing the nucleolus by generating the minimal balanced sets of the player
set. Our nucleolus-finding procedure combine the LP-based algorithm with the constraint
generation framework proposed in (Hallefjord et al., 1995), such that the explicit infor-
mation of the characteristic function of a ridesharing coalition is only computed when it
is “dissatisfied”. In this way the computational burden is significantly reduced.
Note that the constraint generation approach was first proposed in (Gilmore and Gomory,
1961) and was successfully applied to solving the cutting stock problem. Utilizing a similar
idea, (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996) studied the basic vehicle routing game (VRG) in which
a fleet with homogeneous capacity are available. The authors analyzed the properties
of this game and proposed a nucleolus-finding procedure based on coalition generation.
(Engevall et al., 2004) generalized the model of (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996) to consider
vehicles with heterogeneous capacities and studied a real-world case based on their model.
The recent prosperity of ridesharing services has spurred a growing attention from the
research community. There are some game-theoretic studies, either from a cooperative
or non-cooperative perspective, that focus on the mechanism and stability of ridesharing
recommendations. Shen et al. (2016) proposed an online ridesharing mechanism that
satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget-balance in a
non-cooperative context. Zhang et al. (2016) designed a double auction based discounted
trade reduction mechanism for dynamic ridesharing pricing that is individual rational,
incentive compatible, budget balancing and has a larger trading volume. Gopalakrishnan
et al. (2016) studied the costs and benefits of dynamic ridesharing by introducing the
notion of sequential individual rationality and sequential fairness. Wang et al. (2018)
introduced the concept of stable matches, understanding and addressing the gap and
trade-off between the wholistic optimal matchings of and the optimal matchings from
individual rider’s perspective. From a cooperative game theoretic perspective, Bistaffa
et al. (2017, 2015a,b) tackled the coalition formation and payment allocation for the so-
called social ridesharing problem, in which the feasible coalitions of a set of commuters
are restricted by a social network represented by a graph. The authors focused on the
4solution concept of kernel-stable payments.
To sum up, this paper advances the state of the art as the following. In contrast with the
previous related work in which the existence of several restrictions (fixed driver/rider roles,
possible coalitions limited by social network, etc.) significantly reduces the search space,
our model has no such restrictions and therefore is more general. Second, to our best
knowledge, our work is the first attempt that computes the nucleolus which is provably
the most stable payment allocation scheme, compared to other concepts such as kernel
and core, in the context of ridesharing cost allocation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a formulation of the ridesharing cost
allocation problem is developed from a game theory perspective and the properties of
the characteristic function are analyzed. Section 3 discusses the fairness issues in the
ridesharing game regarding the core and the nucleolus. A coalition generation scheme is
then developed to compute the nucleolus. The constraint generation subproblem is ex-
plicitly formulated by a mathematical formulation related to the ridesharing optimization
problem. In Section 4, numerical experiments are conducted and the performance of the
proposed nucleolus procedure is evaluated. Finally, conclusions and future research ideas
are presented in Section 5.
2 Ridesharing Optimization Problem From A Game Theory Perspective
Consider a set of ridesharing participants and denote it by N . Each participant wants
to travel from her origin si to her destination ti. Each participant can potentially be the
driver. Denote the capacity of a vehicle by Q. Consider the subsets of participants that
do not exceed the vehicle capacity, i.e. | S |≤ Q. For each such participant subset s,
assume the feasible route with minimum cost is known. Here by feasible it means the
following conditions are met
1. the route r starts from an agent d′s origin and ends at his destination.
2. Let s−d = s\{d}. For every agent i ∈ s−d, si precedes ti in r.
Denote by cr the cost of such a feasible route and by R the set of feasible routes with
minimal cost. Let air = 1 if participant i (both si and ti) is served by route r and 0
otherwise. The ridesharing optimization problem (RSP) can be formulated as
5(RSP) z = min
∑
r∈R
crxr (1)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ N (2)
xr ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ R (3)
In the formulation xr = 1 if feasible route r is selected and 0 otherwise. Constraints (2)
guarantee that each participant is covered by exactly one route. Note that the coefficient
cr in the objective function is obtained by finding the minimal cost route that covers the
participants for which air = 1, that is, by finding the solution to the corresponding TSP
with precedence constraints.
It is noted that this formulation is characterized by its large number of columns. Therefore,
this formulation is practically solvable by a column generation solution method. Similar
approaches were successfully applied to the vehicle routing problems (VRP) (Balinski
and Quandt, 1964; Desrochers et al., 1992, see). When we solve the RSP with a column
generation approach, it is of our interest to reduce the number of columns. We show this
is possible as follows.
We first introduce the definition of the profitable ridesharing route.
Definition 1 (profitability) Denote by r(S) the corresponding minimum cost feasible
route of participant subset S. r(S) is non-profitable if there exists two non-empty subsets
S1 ∪ S2 = S, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ such that cr(S) > cr(S1) + cr(S2). A route is defined profitable
otherwise.
Intuitively, a shared-ride route becomes non-profitable if by ridesharing the participants
end up spending more money on the transportation cost.
The following proposition shows that we only need to consider a subset of the columns
when solving RSP.
Proposition 1 Let X = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrm} be an optimal solution to RSP, i.e. xri =
1, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then ri,∀i = 1, . . . ,m must be a profitable route.
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Let X = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrm} be an optimal solution
to RSP. Suppose there exists i∗ such that ri∗ is a non-profitable route. Let S∗ be the
corresponding participants that are covered by this route. Then by definition there must
6be two non-empty subsets S∗1 ∪ S∗2 = S∗, S∗1 ∩ S∗2 = ∅ such that cr(S∗) > cr(S∗1 ) + cr(S∗2 ).
Since all the customers that are covered by ri∗ are also covered by r(S
∗
1) and r(S
∗
2), we can
get a new feasible solution X ′ to RSP by substituting xri∗ = 1 with xr(S∗1 ) = 1, xr(S∗2 ) = 1
and xri∗ = 0 while keep all the other x variables unchanged. This feasible solution has a
strictly less cost than X. Contradiction. 2
From a game theory perspective, we denote each ridesharing participant, i ∈ N , by a
player and each subset of participants, S ⊆ N , by a coalition.
The ridesharing cost allocation problem is the problem of finding a “fair” cost allocation
scheme for the ridesharing optimization problem (RSP).
A cooperative ridesharing game is defined by specifying a travel cost for each coalition.
The game is defined by a ridesharing group S, and a characteristic function c(S) : 2S → R
from the set of all possible coalitions (sub-ridesharing group) of players in S to a set of
payment schemes satisfying c(Ø) = 0. Here 2S denotes the power set of S. In the context
of RSP game the characteristic function can be seen as the travel cost occurring if coalition
S ⊆ N is formed. Each coalition can be defined by a binary vector s as
si =
{
1, if customer i is a member of the coalition,
0, otherwise,
Define c as the objective value of a mathematical program. For all coalitions S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅,
let c(S) be the solution to the following mathematical program
c(S) = min
∑
r∈R
crxr (4)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
airxr = si, i ∈ N (5)
xr ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ R (6)
Intuitively, c(S) represents the cost of an optimal route that covers the players in S, i.e.
the players for which si = 1.
When studying a cooperative game, it is of great interest to study the properties of its
characteristic function. Assuming that the singleton coalitions have a positive cost, we
prove that the characteristic function of the RSP game is monotonic and subadditive.
Interested readers can find the proof in the Appendix. It is noteworthy that subadditivity
7implies larger coalitions save more. So it is always beneficial to include more people to
participant in ridesharing and this is a desirable property of the RSP game.
Denote a coalition S whose cardinality is smaller than the vehicle capacity (| S |≤ Q) as
a feasible coalition and otherwise as an infeasible coalition. Denote by S the set of feasible
coalitions. Then we get
c(S) = cr, ∀r ∈ R and S ∈ S such that air = si, i ∈ N.
In addition, denote a coalition such that
∑
i∈S c(i) ≥ c(S) by a profitable coalition and
otherwise by a nonprofitable coalition.
(a) Profitable Coalition, c(S) = 13 (b) Nonprofitable Coalition,
c(S) = 11
Figure 1: Profitable vs. nonprofitable coalition
Figure 1 gives an example where forming a coalition will not always produce desirable
results: instead of reducing total transportation cost as Figure 1(a), Figure 1(b) actually
increases the total cost, meaning it doesn’t make much sense to form such a coalition. In
this case the players are better off on their own. Note that the profitability of forming a
coalition in a large extent depends on the relative geo-locations of the players.
3 Fairness and Stability in RSP Game
3.1 The core and the nucleolus
3.1.1 The core
Let yi be the cost allocated to agent i, i ∈ N . The core of the RSP game is the set of the
cost allocation plans y, such that
8∑
i∈N
yi = c(N), (7)∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S),∀S ⊂ N. (8)
The above inequalities can be interpreted as no single player or coalition should make a
payment that is greater than their cost on their own. A cost allocation scheme that is in
the core is a good allocation as no coalition has the incentive to leave the grand coalition.
An inequality in (8) is called a core defining inequality (CDI).
It is observed that the number of CDIs is in the scale of O(2N). As will be shown in
later sections, in order to find the core and the nucleolus efficiently, it is important and of
our great interest to reduce the number of CDIs. This is possible through the following
propositions.
Proposition 2 Any CDI with a nonprofitable coalition S, S 6= N , is not needed in (8).
Proof: Consider any nonprofitable coalition Sˆ, Sˆ 6= N . Denote by {1, 2, . . . ,m} the
players in Sˆ. By definition of nonprofitable coalition we have
∑
i∈Sˆ c(i) < C(Sˆ). Note
that all individual players are also singleton coalitions. It follows that
yi ≤ c(i),∀i ∈ Sˆ =⇒
∑
i∈Sˆ
yi ≤
∑
i∈Sˆ
c(i) < c(Sˆ).
2
Proposition 3 For a RSP game with non-empty core, any CDI with an infeasible coali-
tion S, S 6= N , is not needed in (8).
Proof: Similar to (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996), let Sˆ, Sˆ 6= N be an infeasible coalition.
Denote by {r1, . . . , rm} the corresponding optimal routes and {s1, . . . , sm} the disjoint
feasible coalitions corresponding to the optimal routes. Since we have
∑m
j=1
∑
i∈Sj yi =∑
i∈Sˆ yi and
∑m
j=1 c(Sj) = c(Sˆ), then we have the following∑
i∈Sj
yi ≤ c(Sj), ∀j = 1, . . . ,m =⇒
∑
i∈Sˆ
yi ≤ c(Sˆ).
2
9From Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we have
C = {y |
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S), S ∈ S;
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N)}.
Thus, when the core of the RSP game is non-empty, the only characteristic function
values of our interests are those corresponding to profitable and feasible coalitions. This,
as will be stated in later sections, reduces the size of the coalition-generating subproblem
dramatically. Note that the calculation of c(S) for a coalition S is equivalent to solving the
corresponding traveling salesman problem with pick-up and drop-off constraints (TSPPD)
for the customers for which si = 1.
3.1.2 The nucleolus
In a cooperative ridesharing game, in which players share travel cost, allocations are the
payments each player need to pay. That is to say, cooperative ridesharing game (RSP
game) is a cost game.
Let c : 2S → R denote the cost characteristic function of a cooperative ridesharing game.
Then the function gives the amount of collective cost a group of players need to pay
through forming a coalition. In an RSP game, the excess of y for a coalition S ⊆ N is
defined as e(y, S) = c(S) −∑i∈S yi and measures the amount of cost-saving of coalition
S in the allocation y, compared to c(S). Note that when e(y, S) is negative, it means
the sum of the cost of S in the allocation y must exceed c(S). Thus e(y, S) measures
the dissatisfaction of S in the allocation y. Recall that the core is defined as the set of
imputations such that c(S) ≥∑i∈S yi for all coalitions S, then we have that an imputation
y is in the core if and only if all its excesses are positive or zero. Denote by θ(y) ∈ R2N the
excess vector of y whose elements c(S) −∑i∈S yi are arranged in non-decreasing order,
that is, θi(y) ≤ θj(y),∀i < j. Then a cost allocation vector y is in the core if and only if
it is efficient and θ1(y) ≥ 0. Consider the lexicographic ordering of excess vectors: for two
payment vectors x, y, we say θ(x) is lexicographically greater than θ(y) if ∃k such that
θi(x) = θi(y),∀i < k and θk(x) > θk(y). Denote this ordering by θ(x)  θ(y).
Definition 2 (Nucleolus) The nucleolus of a RSP game is the lexicographically maximal
imputation. Denote the nucleolus by y and let Y¯ be the set of imputations, then we have
θ(y)  θ(y′), ∀y′ ∈ Y \y.
Intuitively, the nucleolus is by definition the fairest cost allocation plan because it mini-
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mizes the maximal dissatisfaction of all the coalitions in the ridesharing system. Remem-
ber that a coalition is a subset of all the ridesharing groups. As a result, on the condition
that the core is nonempty, the nucleolus is the center of the core, and a ridesharing system
that implements the nucleolus as the cost sharing plan is provably the most stable. It
is of our interest to investigate the non-emptiness of the core of RSP game because the
definitions of nucleolus and the core are related. In fact, the following example shows that
the core of RSP game may be empty.
Figure 2: A three player example
The transportation costs of three players 1, 2, 3 are given in Figure 2. Assuming that each
player’s vehicle has a capacity of one extra passenger seats, the characteristic function of
this 3-player game is then defined by c({1}) = c({2}) = c({3}) = 5, c{1, 2} = c({2, 3}) = 7
(e.g., 1−2−2′−1′), c({1, 3}) = 9 (e.g., 1−3−3′−1′) and c({1, 2, 3}) = 12. The optimal
route configuration is, for example, 2− 3− 3′− 2′ and 1− 1′. We show the calculation of
nucleolus of this example in Table 1.
As an initial guess, we try (4, 4, 4). In Table 1, we find that the minimum excess happens
at coalition (1, 2) and (2, 3). These are the coalitions with maximum dissatisfaction. To
improve this, we must increase both y1 and y3. This involves decreasing y2, and will
decrease the excess for (1, 3) at the same rate. Also note that player 1 and player 3 have
symmetrical roles in this game, thus we can conclude that the best scenario occurs when
the excesses for (1, 2), (2, 3) and (1, 3) are all equal. Solving the equations,
y3 − 5 = y1 − 5 = y2 − 3
y1 + y2 + y3 = 12,
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Table 1: Calculation of nucleolus - empty core
S c(S) e(y, S) (4, 4, 4) (42
3
, 22
3
, 42
3
)
1 5 5− y1 1 13
2 5 5− y2 1 213
3 5 5− y3 1 13
1 and 2 7 7− y1 − y2 = y3 − 5 -1 −13
2 and 3 7 7− y2 − y3 = y1 − 5 -1 −13
1 and 3 9 9− y1 − y3 = y2 − 3 1 −13
Table 2: Calculation of nucleolus - nonempty core
S c(S) e(y, S) (3, 3, 3) (11
3
, 5
3
, 11
3
)
1 5 5− y1 2 4/3
2 5 5− y2 2 10/3
3 5 5− y3 2 4/3
1 and 2 7 7− y1 − y2 = y3 − 2 1 5/3
2 and 3 7 7− y2 − y3 = y1 − 2 1 5/3
1 and 3 9 9− y1 − y3 = y2 3 5/3
we find the nucleolus of this game is y = (42
3
, 22
3
, 42
3
) and C = ∅ (note that c(1, 2) <
y1 + y2).
Interestingly, if we increase the capacity of the vehicles to two extra seat, then we obtain
a game with a nonempty core. In this case, the characteristic function is defined in the
following fashion. For the singleton coalitions and the 2-coalitions, characteristic function
values remain the same. However, for the grand coalition c({1, 2, 3}) = 9. The optimal
route configuration is, for example, 1− 2− 3− 3′ − 2′ − 1′. The calculation of nucleolus
of this example is shown in Table 2.
Initially, we try (3, 3, 3). In Table 2, we find that the minimum excess happens at coalition
(1, 2) and (2, 3). These are the coalitions with maximum dissatisfaction. To improve this,
we must increase both y1 and y3. This involves decreasing y2, and will decrease the excess
for (1, 3) at the same rate. Also note that player 1 and player 3 have symmetrical roles
in this game, therefore we can conclude that the best scenario we can achieve happens
when the excesses for (1, 2), (2, 3) and (1, 3) are all equal. Solving the equations,
y3 − 2 = y1 − 2 = y2
y1 + y2 + y3 = 9,
we find the nucleolus of this game is y = (11/3, 5/3, 11/3). Here, C 6= ∅ and the nucleolus
of this game is the center of the core.
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3.2 An algorithm to find the nucleolus
As discussed before, finding a nucleolus will ensure the ridesharing system implements
the provably fairest cost allocation plan to the users, which also ensures the stability of
the system. A procedure to calculate the nucleolus is developed in this paper and with
sufficient amount of computational resources, a system that is able to handle realistically
large-scale ridesharing service system can be developed. In a nutshell, the proposed algo-
rithm starts with the least core, and continues with lexicographic optimization through
iterating between the master problem and the subproblems. We detail this procedure
below.
3.2.1 The master problem
Since the nucleolus is in the least core, which minimizes the maximal dissatisfaction, we
start with the solution to the following maximin problem
max
y∈Y
min
∀S⊂N
(c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi),
which can be transformed to a linear program
(P 1) max w (9)
s.t. w ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ S (10)∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (11)
Notice that the LP program has O(| S |) constraints, and computing c(S), S ∈ S involves
solving the corresponding TSPPD. So the LP program can easily become intractable. We
therefore approach this problem with a constraint generation procedure. Hallefjord et al.
(1995) has suggested such an approach for linear programming games. Go¨the-Lundgren
et al. (1996) has used a similar approach to solve the vehicle routing problem (VRP)
game.
Since before searching for the nucleolus, we should already know the solution to the
corresponding RSP, thus the optimal route configuration, we can start (P1) with the
coalitions corresponding to the optimal routes. Besides, the singleton coalitions’ cost
values are readily available. Denote by Ω ∈ S the available coalitions, then (P1) can be
13
replaced by the following relaxed problem
(P 1M) max w (12)
s.t. w ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ Ω (13)∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (14)
If the solution to (P 1M) is unique, let it be (y
∗, w∗), i.e. θ1(y∗) > θ1(y′),∀y′ ∈ Y \{y∗},
then y∗ is the nucleolus of the game. If the solution to (P 1M) is not unique, we continue
to find the greatest θ2(y) among the y ∈ Y with θ1(y) = w∗. We continue this process
until the solution to the linear program is unique. At stage t the master LP problem to
be solved is
(P tM) max wt (15)
s.t. wt ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ S\
t−1⋃
τ=1
Γτ , (16)
wτ = c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ Γτ , τ = 1, . . . , t− 1, (17)∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (18)
The solution to the last program in this series is the nucleolus of this game. Let Πt,S be
the dual variable corresponding to constraint w ≤ c(S)−∑i∈S yi. Let Γt denote the set
of coalitions whose corresponding constraints are binding, that is, Γt = {S ∈ S
⋃t−1
τ=1 Γτ |
Π∗t,S > 0}.
The essential idea of constraint generation approach is trying to find the nucleolus with
explicit information of only a small portion of the entire coalition set. This goal is realized
by finding the most violated constraint that is not yet included in Ω via a subproblem
after the master problem is solved at each stage. Denote the optimal solution to (P 1M)
by y∗ = (y∗1, . . . , y
∗
n). The constraint that is violated the most, aka the most unhappy
coalition given the cost allocation scheme y∗, is obtained through solving the following
subproblem
(PS) min
S∈S\Ω
c(S)−
∑
i∈S
y∗i − w∗
This nucleolus-finding procedure for a ridesharing game is developed based on the the-
ories and techniques proposed in Dragan (1981) and Kopelowitz (1967) and a general
14
constraint generation framework proposed in Hallefjord et al. (1995). The pseudocode
of this procedure is given in Algorithm 1. First, at stage t the master LP problem P tM
is solved and both the primal and dual solutions are returned. Second, a subproblem
PS is solved and the least satisfied constraint (s
∗) that is not yet included is identified.
If c∗ ≤ 0, then we include s∗ in ΩINEQ and resolve P tM with newly included constraint
wt ≤ c(s∗)−
∑
i∈s∗ y
∗
i . This stage iterates between the master problem and the subproblem
until no coalition violates the rationality constraints of the master problem (i.e. c∗ ≥ 0).
When this is achieved, we identify the active and binding constraints, reformulate the
master problem (modify ΩINEQ and ΩEQ) and proceed to the next stage (t = t+ 1). This
process continues until the solution y∗ to the master problem is unique. And this last
solution is the nucleolus of the RSP game. Note that in the procedure SP.addCut(s∗), a
cut of the type of inequality (42) is added to the subproblem to prevent the duplication
of row associated with coalition s∗.
The following two subsections will discuss two formulations of subproblem PS. In par-
ticular, we will discuss how the second formulation reduces the complexity of the overall
procedure by utilizing the aforementioned propositions.
3.3 Coalition generation subproblem – general
Recall in the nucleolus-finding scheme described in Algorithm 1, it involves finding the
most violated constraint in the subproblem. This is equivalent to finding the “least
satisfied” subset of customers with a given allocation proposal. A general formulation of
the subproblem is thus
(P 0S) min
S∈S\Ω
c(S)−
∑
i∈S
y∗i − w∗ (19)∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j | Sj ∈ Ω (20)
si ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N (21)
Constraints (20) are preventing the re-generation of constraints.
Note that calculating c(S) is equivalent to solving the RSP model for customers i ∈ S, i.e.
those si = 1. This implies that we can formulate the subproblem P
0
S explicitly. Denote
by G = (V,E) the graph of the RSP game with vertex set V = VO ∪ VD ∪ {0} and edge
set E = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ V, i 6= j}. Here vertex 0 is the “dummy” depot such that any edge
incident with it has a cost of 0. VO(VD) is the origin (destination) vertex set of players
in N . Each player is associated with a profit (prize) equal to y∗i . The subproblem of the
15
Algorithm 1: Procedure of finding the nucleolus of a cooperative ridesharing game
input : Geolocations of customers
output: Nucleolus of the ridesharing game
t := 1 ;
ΩINEQ ;
STOP := false ;
while !STOP do
Solve a master problem P tM ;
Solve a subproblem PS ;
c∗ = minS c(S)−
∑
i∈S y
∗
i − w∗ ;
s∗ = arg min c(S)−∑i∈S y∗i − w∗ ;
if c∗ ≤ 0 then
SP.addCut(s∗) ;
ΩINEQ := ΩINEQ ∪ {s∗} ;
end if
else
STOP := true ;
for every active and binding constraint s do
STOP := false ;
ΩINEQ := ΩINEQ\{s} ;
ΩEQ := ΩEQ ∪ {s} ;
end for
t := t+ 1 ;
end if
end while
constraint generation procedure is to find a subset of customers in N which maximizes
the total prize minus the total cost, while conforming to certain constraints.
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(P 1S) pi = max
∑
k∈N
y∗ksk −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cijλij + w
∗ (22)∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j | Sj ∈ Ω (23)
λ0i − λ(i+n)0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (24)
2n∑
i=0
λik = sk, k ∈ N (25)
2n∑
i=0
λki = sk, k ∈ N (26)
2n∑
i=0
λi,k+n = sk, k ∈ N (27)
2n∑
i=0
λk+n,i = sk, k ∈ N (28)
ui − uj + pλij ≤ p− 1, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (29)
ui < ui+n, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (30)∑
k
yik = 1, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (31)
yik = y(i+n)k, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , n (32)
λ0i = yii, i = 1, . . . , n (33)
λij ≤M1(1− zij), 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (34)
−M2zij ≤ yik − yjk ≤M2zij, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (35)
λij ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (36)
yik ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (37)
zij ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (38)
sk ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ N (39)
This problem can be termed as prize-collecting RSP (see Balas (1989) for an analogy of
TSP and prize-collecting TSP). Constraints (24) make sure that a tour starts at origin and
ends at destination. Constraints (25) - (28) are the continuity constraints. Constraints
(29) are a group of subtour-elimination constraints (SECs) first proposed by Miller et al.
(1960). Here ui are continuous variables called node potentials that indicate the visit
order of node i in the tour, while p denotes the maximal number of nodes a vehicle can
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visit in a tour. This parameter can be used to specify the seat capability of vehicles.
Generally p won’t exceed 10. Constraints (30) ensure that a customer’s origin precedes
his destination. Constraints (31) ensure that each node is visited by exactly one vehciel.
Constraints (32) make sure that a customer’s origin and destination are visited by the
same vehicle. The intuitive meaning of constraints (34) and (35) is that if edge (i, j) is
selected in the solution then nodes i, j must be served by the same vehicle. This set of
constraints serve as a bridge between λ variables (indicating whether an edge is selected)
and y variables (indicating whether a node is served by a particular vehicle). Here M1
and M2 are large numbers.
3.4 Coalition generation subproblem – non-empty core
Recall that when the RSP game has a non-empty core, the only coalitions that are non-
redundant are the feasible coalitions (Proposition 3). Notice that c(S), S ∈ S is the
minimum cost of a feasible route that covers the origin and destination of all the players
in S, that is, those si = 1, i ∈ N . This inspires us to formulate the subproblem explicitly.
Let G = (V,E) be the graph with vertex set V = VO ∪VD ∪{0} and edge set E = {(i, j) |
i, j ∈ V, i 6= j}. Here vertex 0 is the “dummy” depot such that any edge incident with it
has a cost of 0. VO(VD) is the origin (destination) vertex set of players in N . Each player
is associated with a profit (prize) equal to y∗i . The constraint generation subproblem
finds a feasible route in G which maximizes the total prize minus cost, while conforming
to the ridesharing problem constraints, such as capacity, precedence and maximum travel
distance per passenger.
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Denote the edge selection variable in the graph by λ. This problem is represented by
(P 2S) pi = max
∑
k∈N
y∗ksk −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cijλij + w
∗ (40)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
sk ≤ Q (41)∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j | Sj ∈ Ω (42)
λ0i − λ(i+n)0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (43)∑
k∈N
λ0k = 1 (44)∑
k∈N
λk+n,0 = 1 (45)
2n∑
i=0
λik = sk, k ∈ N (46)
2n∑
i=0
λki = sk, k ∈ N (47)
2n∑
i=0
λi,k+n = sk, k ∈ N (48)
2n∑
i=0
λk+n,i = sk, k ∈ N (49)
ui − uj + pλij ≤ p− 1, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (50)
ui < ui+n, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (51)
λij ∈ {0, 1}, i, j ∈ V, i 6= j (52)
sk ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ N (53)
Constraints (42) put the restriction that a constraint that is generated before is not
generated again. Constraints (41) are the capacity constraints and (43) forces a tour
to start at origin and end at destination. Constraints (46), (47), (48) and (49) are the
flow balancing constraints for each vertex. Constraints (50) are the subtour elimination
constraints and (51) are the precedence constraints.
It is noteworthy that the propositions in Section 3.1 help reduce the complexity of Al-
gorithm 1 significantly. This contribution is twofold. First, when the RSP game has a
non-empty core, only feasible coalitions need to be considered in the subproblem (P 2S).
Second, although both prize-collecting RSP (P 1S) and prize-collecting TSPPD (P
2
S) are
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NP-hard, prize-collecting RSP involves rider partitioning, therefore is much more difficult
to solve than prize-collecting TSPPD, which concerns a single route with limited number
of stops.
4 Experiments
We have implemented the nucleolus algorithm (with both P 1S and P
2
S as subproblem) in
Java with CPLEX 12.6 and the Concert library. In this section, we first show the results
of nucleolus algorithm with P 2S as subproblem. Because P
2
S is much easier to solve than
P 1S , and the coalitions needed are much fewer in P
2
S than in P
1
S , nucleolus algorithm with
P 2S can not only calculate the nucleolus when the RSP has a non-empty core, but can
also be used to find an approximate nucleolus when the corresponding RSP has an empty
core. Next, we show a comparison between the nucleolus and the approximate nucleolus,
obtained by using the nucleolus algorithm with P 1S and P
2
S as the subproblem, respectively.
4.1 Approximate nucleolus
We report results for two instances of the 10-player problem, which is the largest problem
we have solved. As will be shown later, the computational bottleneck is not at the
nucleolus algorithm but at solving the corresponding ridesharing optimization problem
(RSP). The data set1 we used in the experiments were selected from Dumitrescu et al.
(2010). The origins and destinations of customers were randomly generated in the square
[0, 1000]× [0, 1000]. The Euclidean distances were used. Table 3 shows the geographical
locations of the players. After solving the RSP MIP model, the optimal ridesharing plan
is {1}, {3, 5}, {4, 6, 7}, {8}, {2, 9}, {10}. These, along with other singleton coalitions are
used to generate the initial constraints of the master LP problem.
At stage 1 three constraints are generated by solving the subproblem. They correspond
to the coalitions of {3, 4, 6}, {4, 6}, and {2, 3, 4, 5, 9}. Active constraints corresponding to
coalitions {8}, {10} and {1} are then identified at the end of stage 1. At stage 2, we notice
that the solution to the master problem (P 2M) is unique, thus we find the approximate
nucleolus. The approximate nucleolus of this game is listed in the last column of Table 3.
In total, 10 + 3 + 3 = 16 out of 210 − 2 = 1022 constraints are needed to compute the
approximate nucleolus, which is only a very small fraction (1.6%).
In our second experiment of prob10d (see Table 4), the optimal ridesharing configuration
is {1}, {2, 3, 4, 6}, {7}, {5, 8}, {9} and {10}. At stage 1, four constraints are generated
1The data sets can be downloaded from http://www.diku.dk/~sropke/
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Table 3: Data and approximate nucleolus of prob10c
Customer
Number
Pickup
Coordinates
Drop-off
Coordinates
Nucleolus
Cost
1 (387, 137) (918, 786) 346.2
2 (595, 4) (852, 236) 267.1
3 (514, 483) ( 9, 481) 627.5
4 (342, 655) (609, 55) 729.7
5 (715, 887) (372, 215) 434.3
6 (111, 687) (777, 91) 250.4
7 (692, 933) (203, 173) 97.5
8 (791, 847) (488, 312) 226.1
9 (702, 762) (928, 755) 520.8
10 (543, 443) ( 90, 700) 92.4
after via solving the subproblem. They correspond to the coalitions of {2, 3, 4, 9}, {3, 6},
{2, 9} and {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. At stage 2, the master LP problem is found to have a unique
solution. This solution is thus the approximate nucleolus of this game. The approximate
nucleolus is listed in the last column of Table 4. In total, (10 + 2 + 4)/1022 ≈ 1.6%
constraints were needed to compute the approximate nucleolus.
Table 4: Data and approximate nucleolus of prob10d
Customer
Number
Pickup
Coordinates
Drop-off
Coordinates
Nucleolus
Cost
1 ( 60, 742) ( 34, 697) 52.0
2 (730, 471) (390, 845) 444.1
3 (964, 151) ( 39, 78) 808.7
4 (336, 763) ( 11, 332) 481.2
5 (330, 593) (570, 862) 326.9
6 (496, 333) ( 88, 346) 374.1
7 (168, 403) (432, 341) 271.2
8 (343, 502) (525, 846) 173.3
9 (600, 534) (585, 615) 83.0
10 ( 18, 952) (494, 605) 589.0
It is noteworthy to point out that the computational time for both instances is very small
(less than 10s), indicating the bottleneck is the optimization solution method.
4.2 Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus
In this subsection we conduct two experiments to compare the actual nucleolus and the
approximate nucleolus. Finding the actual nucleolus by using Algorithm 1 with P 1S as
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Table 5: Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus – problem8a
Customer
Number
Nucleolus
Cost
Approximate
Nucleolus Cost
1 442.1 449.9
2 505.0 512.8
3 639.2 636.6
4 409.3 406.7
5 527.6 525.0
6 465.8 463.2
7 228.4 225.8
8 519.4 516.8
subproblem is a very time-consuming process. In our first example, problem8a, it takes 5
hours to find the actual nucleolus. In our second example, problem8b, the time it takes
to find the actual nucleolus goes up to 20 hours.
The actual nucleolus cost and approximate nucleolus cost are summarized in Table 5 and
Table 6. As we can see, the solutions obtained by the approximate nucleolus algorithm
are a close approximation for the actual nucleolus in both cases.
It is of our interest to see the computational performance of Algorithm 1 using P 1S and
P 2S . In problem8a, a total of 193 constraints are generated by P
1
S , comparing to a total of
9 constraints generated by P 2S . In problem10d, a total of 184 coalitions are generated by
P 1S , comparing to a total of only 9 coalitions generated by P
2
S . Note that the total number
of coalitions (not including the empty set and the universal set) is 28 − 2 = 254 for prob-
lem8a and problem8b. Therefore, Algorithm 1 using P 1S generated 193/254 = 76% and
184/254 = 72% of the total constraints to find the nucleolus in problem8a and problem8b,
respectively. So Algorithm 1 using P 1S is more like an enumeration procedure. Thus P
2
S is
much more computationally efficient than P 1S , since the number of constraints generated
by P 1S are significantly higher than that of P
2
S . This along with the fact that P
1
S is much
harder to solve than P 2S explains the significant time difference between Algorithm 1 using
P 1S and P
2
S .
In Figure 3 and 4 we measure the Euclidean distance between the incumbent nucleolus
and the actual nucleolus (
√∑
i∈N(y
∗
i − yi)2) as the algorithm iterates. These two figures
show the solution path of the algorithm in both cases. As can be seen, in both cases,
the algorithm found the nucleolus before it stopped. This happened before the 20th
iteration in problem8a, and before 75 constraints were generated in problem8b. It means
the majority of the running time of this algorithm is consumed after the actual nucleolus
is found.
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Table 6: Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus – problem8b
Customer
Number
Nucleolus
Cost
Approximate
Nucleolus Cost
1 366.5 366.5
2 507.1 457.7
3 594.1 617.1
4 387.6 456.7
5 1012.5 1035.6
6 258.1 235.1
7 545.3 571.8
8 235.9 166.8
Figure 3: Solution path – problem8a
5 Conclusions
We studied an important problem faced by ridesharing service provider: how to allocate
cost among ridesharing participants to ensure sustainability and fairness. This fair cost
allocation problem was modeled as a cooperative game. A special property of the cooper-
ative ridesharing game is that its characteristic function values are calculated by solving
an optimization problem. To better understand this game, we further studied the char-
acteristic function and proved it to be monotone, subadditive, but non-convex (meaning
the core can be empty). The most fair allocation plan is identified by the nucleolus of the
RSP game. We then proposed an iterative constraint-generation algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for calculating it in two situations – the game has an empty core and the game has a
non-empty core. In both cases the algorithm utilizes an explicitly formulated MIP as the
subproblem to generate constraints. When the game has an empty core, the algorithm
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Figure 4: Solution path – problem8b
uses P 1S as the subproblem and becomes an enumeration procedure to find the nucleolus of
the game. When the game has a non-empty core, this algorithm uses P 2S as the subproblem
which utilizes the special properties of the RSP game such that the characteristic function
values are computed only when they are needed. Therefore the number of subproblems
(an NP-hard optimization problem) that need to be solved is significantly reduced. Ex-
periments showed that by adopting this algorithm with P 2S only a small fraction (1.6%)
of the coalition constraints were needed to find the nucleolus. It is also found in the
experiments where the emptiness of the RSP game is unclear, the algorithm with P 2S can
be used to find an approximate nucleolus that is close to the actual one. This indicates
that our proposed algorithm is promising in finding nucleolus of dynamic, large-scale RSP
game and that since a cooperative game theory modeling approach does not necessarily
differentiate drivers and riders explicitly, our model, the mathematical programs and the
algorithm proposed in this paper also have very promising application in an autonomous
vehicle ridesharing systems. We can see a few interesting and promising future research
directions related to this study. First, efficient heuristics for the subproblems can be de-
veloped. Second, with such efficient algorithms in hand, we can further investigate the
interaction between the vehicle capacity and the cost allocation, which we believe will
provide insight on the intrinsic nature of ridesharing game. Besides, we started our study
with the motivation of designing mathematical models and algorithms for the most gen-
eral case of ridesharing scenario with the least amount of assumptions on the coalition etc.
However in the real world, the existence of certain situations can significantly simplify the
calculation. For instance, in the case some of the ridesharing participants have formed a
coalition on their own, we can exploit these structural properties to simplify the coalition
generation scheme and expedite the nucleolus calculation.
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Appendix
We show the RSP game has the following properties. From here on we denote by C(·)
the mathematical program that defines the characteristic function value of ·, i.e. c(·).
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity) The characteristic function of the RSP game is mono-
tone, that is, c(S) ≤ c(T ), S ⊂ T ⊂ N .
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists S ⊂ T ⊂ N and c(S) > c(T ). Let
X = {xr | r ∈ R} be an optimal solution to C(T ). Let RT = {ri | xri = 1}.
For r ∈ R, we construct a feasible solution to C(S) in the following manner. Let
xr =
{
1, if ∃i ∈ S such that air = 1,
0, otherwise.
Let X ′ be the solution constructed in the above way. Denote by RS the set of selected
routes. Intuitively, we keep those routes in RT that covers at least one player in S and
discard those don’t.
It is known that X must satisfy∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ T∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ N − T
Because S ⊂ T , then X ′ must satisfy∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ S∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ T − S∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ N − T
This is equivalent to ∑
r∈R
airxr = si, i ∈ N
So X ′ is a feasible solution to C(S). In addition, since the cost matrix {cij} is positive,
the route cost is also positive. Therefore the cost of X ′ is less than c(T ), which is less
than c(S). Note that c(S) is the optimal cost, so this is a contradiction. 2
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Proposition 5 (Subadditivity) The characteristic cost function of RSP game is sub-
additive, i.e., c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ), S, T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof: Let RS, RT be the optimal solution to C(S), C(T ), respectively. Because S, T ⊂
N and S∩T = ∅, RS,T = RS∪RT must cover all the players in S∪T , i.e. RS,T is a feasible
solution to C(S ∪ T ). Since this solution has an objective value equal to c(S) + c(T ), we
have c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ). 2
